Reading Notes from Underground, one of the Underground Man's contradictions particularly struck me: he laughs at dualism, and yet is somewhat obsessed with the idea of free will. I think that these two positions are totally inconsistent.
To be totally honest, the idea of "free will" has never made much sense to me. It supposedly means the ability of people to make choices, like the choice to be "good" or "bad" to use the archetypal example. If I take the materialist position that people's actions are entirely determined by the physical state of their bodies and brains, I am anti-free will. If I say that people can "overrule" their bodies, then I am pro-free will. But the latter position implies some sort of mind-body dichotomy, since something has to do the choosing and something has to be the object of the choice. Another way of putting this is that there is a completely external, non-material agent doing the choosing for us--which sounds awfully anti-free will.
I think that the problem inherent in answering the question "Do I choose to do what I do?" is imprecision in the definitions of "I" and "choose". When people say "I", to what do they refer? I think that generally the pro-free will people are referring to the soul, or more prosaically the mind (in the true sense of the word--the conscious, thinking element of a person). Anti-free will people, meanwhile, are referring to the entire physical manifestation of a human, in which case the answer is that the question doesn't make sense--you do what you do; "choosing" is nonsense, because it implies the above-noted dichotomy.
Before I get back Notes from Underground, let me backtrack a little. A lot of what U.M. talks about in relation to free will is physical determinism: the idea that if some entity "knew" all of the information (a term cosmologists use to refer to mass and energy) and rules in the universe, it could predict what all of that information would be in ten million years, or what it was a few seconds ago. This means that the universe is physically deterministic and reversible. A simple case of such a universe is one that oscillates between two states, "T" and "H" like this: "THTHTHTHTH...". If I tell you the state is T, you know that it was just H and will be H one state later. Modern physicists, however, think that our universe is actually more like a coin toss: "THHTHTHHTHHTTTTH". At some level, it is unpredictable and not deterministic; not only that, but it is impossible to be aware of the exact location and energy of every particle in the universe--and talking about "exact location and energy" may not make sense at all.
This is what UM means when he says that people would not be able to stand being predicted by a "table"--the sort of algorithm our omniscient entity might make in a deterministic universe. He argues contrarily that people would rebel against such predictability. I think that this is nonsense: if we lived in a deterministic universe and had tables made by an omniscient demon, there would be no external factors that our demon couldn't predict; UM's hypothetical is simultaneously materialistic and dualistic. When I think about it, this logical error is almost the source of his evil. He constantly wants to rebel and do what he shouldn't do (dualism) but he thinks that he can't change how he is (materialism).